Finetuning, many worlds, and the 'inverse gambler's fallacy'

Noûs 39 (2):337–347 (2005)
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Abstract

A number of authors have claimed that the fact that our universe seems ’fine-tuned’ is evidence that there are many universes. Ian Hacking (1987) raised doubts about inferences to many sequential universes. More recently, Roger White has argued that it is a fallacy to infer that there are many universes, whether existing all at once or sequentially, from the fact that ours is fine-tuned. The upshot of our discussion will be that Hacking is right about the existence of certain fallacious inferences, but that he (and White) are incorrect in their assimilation of arguments for many universes to these fallacious cases

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Cory Juhl
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident that Other Universes Exist.Bradford Saad - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1):29-44.
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In Defense of the Requirement of Total Evidence.Paul Draper - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (1):179-190.

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