- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Plato's Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2017)
Abstract
Rachana Kamtekar offers a new understanding of Plato's account of the soul and its impact on our living well or badly, virtuously or viciously. She argues that throughout the dialogues Plato maintains that human beings have a natural desire for our own good, and that actions and conditions contrary to this desire are involuntary.Author's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good by Rachana Kamtekar. [REVIEW]Ravi Sharma - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):160-161.
Plato's Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good by Rachana Kamtekar.Emily Fletcher - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):643-646.
Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good, by Rachana Kamtekar. [REVIEW]G. S. Bowe - 2019 - Ancient Philosophy 39 (2):477-481.
Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good, written by Rachana Kamtekar.Sabrina Little - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):363-366.
Rachana Kamtekar, Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for the Good (review).Nicholas D. Smith - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):404-408.
Contemplation and self-mastery in Plato's Phaedrus.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 42:77-107.
Comments on Rachana Kamtekar, Plato’s Moral Psychology.Gabriel R. Lear - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):221-227.
Psychological eudaimonism and the natural desire for the good: Comments on Rachana Kamtekar's Plato's Moral Psychology.Iakovos Vasiliou - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):234-239.
Plato's Ethics: Early and Middle Dialogues.Terry Penner - 2018 - In Sean D. Kirkland & Eric Sanday (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. pp. 151–169.
The divided soul and desire for the good in Plato's republic.Mariana Anagnostopoulos - 2006 - In Gerasimos Xenophon Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato's "Republic". Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 166--188.
Analytics
Added to PP
2017-12-19
Downloads
29 (#537,165)
6 months
3 (#1,206,053)
2017-12-19
Downloads
29 (#537,165)
6 months
3 (#1,206,053)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Kant and Psychological Monism: the Case of Inclination.Melissa Merritt - forthcoming - In James Conant & Jonas Held (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave MacMillan.
Plato's Socrates and his Conception of Philosophy.Eric Brown - 2022 - In David Ebrey & Richard Kraut (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117-145.
Plato on the Enslavement of Reason.Mark A. Johnstone - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):382-394.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6686886f5-2nz2h uwo