Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie?

This article was primarily a reaction to Dennett's Sweet Dreams (2005). In it Dennett pretends to renounce zombies. But what he means is that consciousness is nothing beyond that which can be tested behaviorally and objectively, so since zombies pass these tests, they can't be said to be unconscious – yet that is part of their definition. So they are a contradiction. In other words, zombies are inconceivable because a being that is "behaviorally, objectively indistinguishable from a conscious person" just doesn't deserve in Dennett's eyes to be called unconscious. I argue, to the contrary, that zombies must lack brains since it is perfectly clear that in our universe having a brain (normally) entails having consciousness. I argue also that brain states are about people and things in the world, meaning for example that for some brain state S, necessarily if one is in brain state S, one is thinking about external object A. The brain "comes with" a world. The brain, therefore, transcends the boundaries of the skull. Science (and Dennett) cannot reduce the brain to something that doesn't pull off this most astonishing of feats.
Keywords consciousness  brain  direct realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
You Can't Argue with a Zombie.Jaron Lanier - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):333-345.
Brief Annotated Bibliography of Works by and About Daniel Dennett.Books by Daniel Dennett - 2002 - In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.
The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.
Dispatches From the Zombie Wars.Dean Zimmerman - forthcoming - The Times Literary Supplement (April 28).
Why Zombies Won't Stay Dead.Todd C. Moody - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):365-372.
Actors Are Not Like Zombies.E. Diaz-Leon - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):115-122.
Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness.Susan Schneider - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 313--24.
Dennett on Free Will.Craig Ross - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):137-149.
What RoboDennett Still Doesn't Know.Michael Beaton - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):3-25.
Daniel C. Dennett Responds.Daniel Dennett - 2007 - Free Inquiry 27:60-61.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
934 ( #1,118 of 2,214,632 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
117 ( #1,504 of 2,214,632 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature