Avoiding Omnidoxasticity in Logics of Belief: A Reply to MacPherson

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (3):475-495 (1995)

Abstract
In recent work MacPherson argues that the standard method of modeling belief logically, as a necessity operator in a modal logic, is doomed to fail. The problem with normal modal logics as logics of belief is that they treat believers as "ideal" in unrealistic ways (i.e., as omnidoxastic); however, similar problems re-emerge for candidate non-normal logics. The authors argue that logics used to model belief in artificial intelligence (AI) are also flawed in this way. But for AI systems, omnidoxasticity is impossible because of their finite nature, and this fact can be exploited to produce operational models of fallible belief. The relevance of this point to various philosophical views about belief is discussed
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1040149361
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,545
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Some Admissible Rules in Nonnormal Modal Systems.Timothy Williamson - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (3):378-400.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-24

Total views
10 ( #763,532 of 2,280,499 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #833,382 of 2,280,499 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature