Why the Rare Charles Bonnet Cases Are Not Evidence of Misrepresentation

Abstract
Recently, the possibility of misrepresentation has resurfaced in the debate between higher-order thought theorists and their opponents. One new element in the debate has been the rare cases of Charles Bonnet syndrome , proposed as empirical evidence for misrepresentation as posited by the higher-order theories. In this article I will spell out the argument supposedly underlying the claim that the RCB cases are genuine empirical evidence of misrepresentation. I will then proceed to show that this argument relies on a hidden premise. With this premise exposed the argument cannot support the notion of misrepresentation posited by higher-order theories
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DOI 10.5840/jpr20148420
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