Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1484-1495 (2003)

Authors
Tarja Knuuttila
University of Vienna
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that models in scientific practice can be conceived of as epistemic artifacts. Approaching models this way accommodates many such things that working scientists themselves call models but that the semantic conception of models does not duly recognize as such. That models are epistemic artifacts implies, firstly, that they cannot be understood apart from purposeful human activity; secondly, that they are somehow materialized inhabitants of the intersubjective field of that activity; and thirdly, that they can function also as knowledge objects. We argue that models as epistemic artifacts provide knowledge in many other ways than just via direct representative links. To substantiate our view we use a language‐technological artifact, a parser, as an example.
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DOI 10.1086/377424
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Modelling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based Representation.Tarja Knuuttila - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):262-271.
How Do Models Give Us Knowledge? The Case of Carnot’s Ideal Heat Engine.Tarja Knuuttila & Mieke Boon - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):309-334.
Isolation Is Not Characteristic of Models.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):119 - 137.
Towards a General Model of Applying Science.Rens Bod - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):5 – 25.

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