Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Bounds of Self: An Essay on Heidegger's by R. Matthew ShockeyNicolai KnudsenR. Matthew Shockey. The Bounds of Self: An Essay on Heidegger's Being and Time. New York: Routledge, 2021. Pp. 224. Hardcover, $160.00.In this rich and ambitious book, R. Matthew Shockey controversially claims that Heidegger's Being and Time (SZ) is an heir to the rationalism of Descartes and Kant. To show this, Shockey develops a provocative account of phenomenological ontology as the normatively inert outcome of reflective and imaginative philosophical self-questioning.Four questions of an increasingly higher order frame the book (2–6): (1) How shall I live? (2) What is it to be the kind of being who can and must ask "how shall I live?" (3) What unity is there to the various ways in which things are taken to be? (4) Why should we pursue metaphysics and ontology? Chapters 1–6 reconstruct Heidegger's answers to the second- and third-order questions, while chapter 7 relates them back to the questions of the first- and fourth-order.The key claim is that Heidegger was a "Kantian Cartesian." Shockey, however, admits that Heidegger was not "driven by a need to refute skepticism, a proponent of a worldly subjectivism, a representationalist epistemologist, or a substance dualist" (9). Rather, the claim is that Heidegger follows Kant and Descartes in believing, first, that ontology must identify a form of "a priori knowledge" as the basis of intelligibility and, second, that ontological inquiry requires a deliberate, reflective, and self-questioning method.The argument rests on a reconstruction of the published parts of SZ as involving a series of meditative steps that are supposed to take us from the analytic of Dasein (the second-order question) to the meaning of being (the third-order question). Chapter 1 explains why the Seinsfrage (the third-order question) requires the analytic of Dasein (the second-order question) and argues that ontology requires that we abstract from all our ontical characteristics (i.e. all the things that make me, me and you, you) insofar as the aim of ontology is to identify the "bounds" that are shared by any ontological inquirer (47). This, Shockey claims, makes Heidegger's existential analytics critical in a roughly Kantian way and meditational in a roughly Cartesian way (31, 47).Chapter 2 follows the analysis of worldhood and being-with in introducing us to three regions of entities that we are not: the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, and other Dasein. The next chapters turn away from our understanding of "outward" entities and initiates a series of "inward" meditative steps supposed to clarify the unitary and a priori basis rendering [End Page 718] these regions intelligible. Chapter 3 analyzes the first meditative step, namely, Heidegger's account of being-in and the trinity of understanding, discourse, and self-finding that constitute the structure of care. Chapter 4 shows, in a second step, that the care structure is unified by originary temporality. Originary temporality is, Shockey argues, the necessary temporal form that Dasein spontaneously gives to itself.Heidegger abandoned the SZ project at this point, but Shockey ambitiously undertakes to complete it by showing, in chapter 5, how Heidegger found a final meditative step in Kant's concept of imagination. On Heidegger's controversial interpretation of Kant, the imagination is the common root of understanding and sensibility and, importantly, an anticipation of his own concept of originary temporality. Imagination, Shockey explains, is the general capacity for "making present that which is absent" (141). Based on this argument, Shockey concludes that "in doing ontology, we imagine ourselves imagining being" (148).Having reconstructed the final and missing meditative step, Shockey in chapter 6 presents what he thinks would have been the story of the unwritten (or discarded) division 3 of SZ, namely, that Descartes and Kant, when read as ontologists rather than epistemologists, were right in claiming that the unity of being is located in our a priori ontological (self-) understanding, although they failed to realize that this unity is imaginative and temporal rather than substantial or logical and that the a priori basis for intelligibility opens up several distinct regions of...