The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects

Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95 (2008)
Abstract
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
Keywords Intentionality  Intentional objects  Adverbialism  Ontological commitment
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7
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References found in this work BETA
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Intentionality: Some Lessons From the History of the Problem From Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
Perception and Computation.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.

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