The Philosophers' Magazine 44 (44):36-41 (2009)

Authors
Oskari Kuusela
University of East Anglia
Abstract
Wittgenstein’s rejection of philosophical theories doesn’t mean that he, or whoever adopts his method, couldn’t have any positive views about the objects of philosophical investigation. It merely means not presenting those views in a dogmatic manner, as theses that all relevant cases must fit. Wittgenstein’s approach allows one not to take sides in philosophical disputes and to take on board whatever might be correct in the traditional theories
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1354-814X
DOI 10.5840/tpm200944105
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