``Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries"

In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160 (2009)
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis

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