Kripke and the dogmatism paradox

Authors
Kaave Lajevardi
University of Toronto (PhD)
Abstract
I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of 'A is dogmatic with respect to p', and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement 'A should ignore all the evidence against p'. For the most part, I deal with Kripke's original version of the paradox, wherein the subject wishes, above all else, to avoid losing her true belief or gaining a false one; in the final section I investigate the possibility of having a paradox for a subject who values knowledge above anything else.
Keywords Dogmatism paradox  knowledge  true belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Synchronic Dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
Knowledge and Dogmatism.Peter Baumann - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):1-19.
Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.
A Defense of Dogmatism.Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox.Patrick Bondy - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):283-292.
Paradoxes About Belief.Jesper Kallestrup - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117.
Linguistic Competence and Kripke's Puzzle.Patricia Hanna - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):171-189.
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
The Liar: What Paradox? [REVIEW]Avrum Stroll - 1988 - Argumentation 2 (1):63-75.
Paradox.Doris Olin - 2003 - Routledge.
Paradox.Doris Olin - 2003 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
Fallibilism and the Lottery Paradox.Baron Reed - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-09-07

Total downloads
297 ( #13,512 of 2,259,957 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
69 ( #4,710 of 2,259,957 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature