The Place of the Intentional in the Explanation of Behavior

Grazer Philosophische Studien 6 (1):75-84 (1978)
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Abstract

This paper surveys the main attitudes toward intentional explanation in recent psychology. Specifically, the positions of reductionistic behaviorism, materialism and replacement behaviorism are critically examined. Finally, an assessment of the current state of the controversy is presented.

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