Reply to Lorne Falkenstein

Kantian Review 5 (1):64-72 (2001)
In Kantian Humility I argue that, for Kant, ignorance of things in themselves is ignorance of the intrinsic properties of substances, and that this is epistemic humility, rather than idealism: some aspects of reality, the intrinsic aspects, are beyond our epistemic grasp.The interpretation draws upon what Falkenstein takes to be ‘a novel and not implausible understanding of Kant's distinction between things in themselves and appearances’ which views it as a distinction between the intrinsic and the relational. He concedes that Kant frequently puts his distinction in just these terms, that I make ‘a strong textual case for it’, that it is ‘plausible and intriguing’ and that it may even be ‘correct, at least for a certain strand of Kant's thought’. He presumably also allows that this distinction between ‘things as they are in relation to other things and things as they are on their own’ is at base a metaphysical distinction, which makes no mention of how things look to us, appear to us or depend on our minds. I am pleased to find sympathy for this understanding of Kant's distinction in a review whose overall tenor is so critical
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S1369415400000649
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,106
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Extrinsic Properties.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
Bounds of Sense.Peter Strawson - 1990 - Routledge.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Kant's Account of Sensation.Lorne Falkenstein - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):63 - 88.
Kant's Account of Intuition.Lorne Falkenstein - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):165 - 193.
Reid and Smith on Vision.Lorne Falkenstein - 2004 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (2):103-118.
Hume and Baxter on Identity Over Time. [REVIEW]Lorne Falkenstein - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):425 - 433.
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac.Lorne Falkenstein - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hume's Reason.Lorne Falkenstein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):233-236.
Kant's Empiricism.Lorne Falkenstein - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 50 (3):547 - 589.
Nativism and the Nature of Thought in Reid's Account of Our Knowledge of the External World.Lorne Falkenstein - 2004 - In Terence Cuneo Rene van Woudenberg (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 156--179.
Hume's Answer to Kant.Lorne Falkenstein - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):331-360.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

20 ( #248,475 of 2,171,744 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #173,730 of 2,171,744 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums