The fine-tuning argument

Abstract

Our laws of nature and our cosmos appear to be delicately fine-tuned for life to emerge. First, if the initial conditions prevailing immediately after the Big Bang had been ever so slightly different, then the universe would either have recollapsed immediately, or would have expanded far too quickly into a chilling, eternal void. Second, if any one of the fundamental forces of nature had been a tiny bit different in strength, or if the masses of some elementary particles had been a little unlike they are, there would have been no stars and no recognizable chemistry, and hence no Sun, no Earth, no carbon, et cetera. These highly special conditions and numbers suggest some sort of a conspiracy of literally cosmic proportions, which seems rather hard to attribute to chance. Some theologians and religiously oriented scientists and philosophers have taken advantage of this apparent fine-tuning of the clockwork of the universe to revive the scholastic Argument from Design, but also secular thinkers have felt the need to explain fine-tuning, typically by proposing the existence of a `Multiverse', i.e., a vast family of universes existing in parallel, of which ours is merely one, singled out by the `Anthropic Principle' to the effect that it is the only one that can possibly contain observers and hence can be observed. We analyze this issue from a sober perspective. Having reviewed the literature and having added several observations of our own, we conclude that cosmic fine-tuning turns out to support neither Design nor a Multiverse, both of which fail to explain fine-tuning or even to increase its likelihood. In fact, fine-tuning and Design rather seem to be at odds with each other, except when one makes an additional assumption that is practically indistinguishable from Design and hence renders the whole argument circular. Likewise, the inference from fine-tuning to a Multiverse only works if the latter is underwritten by a startling metaphysical hypothesis we consider unwarranted. Instead, we conclude that fine-tuning requires no special explanation at all, since it is not the Universe that is fine-tuned for life, but life that has been fine-tuned to the Universe.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,127

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

The fine-tuning argument.Neil A. Manson - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):271-286.
A Theological Critique of the Fine-Tuning Argument.Hans Halvorson - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 122-135.
A New Fine-Tuning Argument for the Multiverse.Simon Friederich - 2019 - Foundations of Physics 49 (9):1011-1021.
On Friederich’s New Fine-Tuning Argument.Thomas Metcalf - 2021 - Foundations of Physics 51 (2):1-15.
The fine-tuning argument.M. C. Bradley - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (4):451-466.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-07

Downloads
94 (#187,657)

6 months
13 (#219,908)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Klaas Landsman
Radboud University Nijmegen

Citations of this work

Fine-Tuning the Multiverse.Thomas Metcalf - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):3-32.
Reconsidering the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy Charge Against the Fine-Tuning Argument for the Multiverse.Simon Friederich - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (1):29-41.

Add more citations