Ontology in the theory of meaning

This paper advances a general argument, inspired by some remarks of Davidson, to show that appeal to meanings as entities in the theory of meaning is neither necessary nor sufficient for carrying out the tasks of the theory of meaning. The crucial point is that appeal to meaning as entities fails to provide us with an understanding of any expression of a language except insofar as we pick it out with an expression we understand which we tacitly recognize to be a translation of the term whose meaning we want to illuminate by the appeal to assigning to it a meaning. The meaning drops out as irrelevant: the work is done, and can only be done, by matching terms already understood with terms they translate.
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DOI 10.1080/09672550600858312
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.J. D. Bastable - 1961 - Philosophical Studies 11:327-328.

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Citations of this work BETA
Propositions and Higher-Order Attitude Attributions.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):741-765.
Lepore and Ludwig on 'Explicit Meaning Theories'.Miguel Hoeltje - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):831-839.

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