Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):688-688 (1995)

Authors
Abstract
Gray's integration of the different levels of description and explanation in his theory is problematic: The introduction of consciousness into his theorising consists of the mind-brain identity assumption, which tells us nothing new. There need not be correlations between levels of description. Gray's account does not extend beyond “brute” correlation. Integration must be achieved in a principled, mutually constraining way.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x0004053x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,683
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.

View all 117 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-01-20

Total views
37 ( #297,116 of 2,462,457 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,311 of 2,462,457 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes