Economics Letters 159:221-223 (2017)

Authors
Yang Liu
Cambridge University
Abstract
This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage's formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.
Keywords Bayesian decision theory  the sure-thing principle  dominance principle  conditional preference
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability.Leonard J. Savage - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):305-310.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1959 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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Citations of this work BETA

Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probability.Yang Liu - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa009.
Two Tales of Epistemic Models.Yang Liu - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):291-302.

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