The Sure-thing Principle and P2

Economics Letters 159:221-223 (2017)
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Abstract

This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage's formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.

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Yang Liu
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probabilities.Yang Liu - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):795-810.
Two Tales of Epistemic Models.Yang Liu - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):291-302.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Difficulties in the theory of personal probability.Leonard J. Savage - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):305-310.

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