Philosophical Studies 176 (1):175-195 (2019)

Authors
Jonathan Livengood
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
In this paper, I show how one might resist two influential arguments for the Likelihood Principle by appealing to the ontological significance of creative intentions. The first argument for the Likelihood Principle that I consider is the argument from intentions. After clarifying the argument, I show how the key premiss in the argument may be resisted by maintaining that creative intentions sometimes independently matter to what experiments exist. The second argument that I consider is Gandenberger’s :475–503, 2015) rehabilitation of Birnbaum’s :269–306, 1962) proof of the Likelihood Principle from the more intuitively obvious principles of conditionality and sufficiency. As with the argument from intentions, I show how Gandenberger’s argument for his Experimental Conditionality Principle may be resisted by maintaining that creative intentions sometimes independently matter to what experiments exist.
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Reprint years 2017, 2019
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-1011-5
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References found in this work BETA

Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
What Do the Folk Think About Composition and Does It Matter?Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2017 - In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 187-206.
Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie Thomasson - 1999 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (2):190-192.

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Stopping rules as experimental design.Samuel Fletcher - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):1-20.

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