14 found
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  1.  38
    This is a Tricky Situation: Situationism and Reasons-Responsiveness.Marcela Herdova & Stephen Kearns - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):151-183.
    Situations are powerful: the evidence from experimental social psychology suggests that agents are hugely influenced by the situations they find themselves in, often without their knowing it. In our paper, we evaluate how situational factors affect our reasons-responsiveness, as conceived of by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and, through this, how they also affect moral responsibility. We argue that the situationist experiments suggest that situational factors impair, among other things, our moderate reasons-responsiveness, which is plausibly required for moral responsibility. However, (...)
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  2. Get Lucky: Situationism and Circumstantial Moral Luck.Marcela Herdova & Stephen Kearns - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):362-377.
    Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for (...)
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  3.  15
    Trigger Warning: No Proximal Intentions Required for Intentional Action.Marcela Herdova - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383.
    In this paper, I argue that some intentional actions are not triggered by proximal intentions; i.e. there are actions which are intentional, but lack relevant proximal intentions in their immediate causal history. More specifically, I first introduce various properties of intentions. I then argue that some actions are triggered by mental states which lack properties typically ascribed to intentions, yet these actions are still intentional. The view that all intentional actions are triggered by proximal intentions is thus false.
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  4.  21
    Transformative Moral Luck.Marcela Herdova - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):162-180.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  5.  38
    Self-Control and Mechanisms of Behavior: Why Self-Control is Not a Natural Mental Kind.Marcela Herdova - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):731-762.
    In this paper, I argue for two main hypotheses. First, that self-control is not a natural mental kind and, second, that there is no dedicated mechanism of self-control. By the first claim, I simply mean that those behaviors we label as “self-controlled” are a somewhat arbitrarily selected hodgepodge that do not have anything in common that distinguishes them from other behaviors. In other words, self-control is a gerrymandered property that does not correspond to a natural mental or psychological kind. By (...)
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  6.  40
    Are Intentions in Tension with Timing Experiments?Marcela Herdova - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):573-587.
    Libet’s timing experiments have resulted in some strong and unsavoury claims about human agency. These range from the idea that conscious intentions are epiphenomenal to the idea that we all lack free will. In this paper, I propose a new type of response to the various sceptical conclusions about our agency occasioned by both Libet’s work and other experiments in this testing paradigm. Indeed, my argument extends to such conclusions drawn from fMRI-based prediction experiments. In what follows, I will provide (...)
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  7. What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Situationism, Conscious Awareness, Control.Marcela Herdova - 2016 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 4 (1):45-71.
    The thesis of situationism says that situational factors can exert a signi cant in uence on how we act, o en without us being consciously aware that we are so in uenced. In this paper, I examine how situational factors, or, more speci cally, our lack of conscious awareness of their in uence on our behavior, a ect di erent measures of control. I further examine how our control is a ected by the fact that situational factors also seem to (...)
     
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  8.  24
    Barking Up the Wrong Tree: On Control, Transformative Experiences, and Turning Over a New Leaf.Marcela Herdova - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):278-293.
    I argue that we do not intentionally and rationally shape our character and values in major ways. I base this argument on the nature of transformative experiences, that is, those experiences which are transformative from personal and epistemological points of view. The argument is roughly this. First, someone who undergoes major changes in her character or values thereby undergoes a transformative experience. Second, if she undergoes such an experience, her reasons for changing in a major way are inaccessible to her (...)
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  9.  39
    Difficult Circumstances: Situationism and Ability.Marcela Herdova & Stephen Kearns - 2019 - Journal of Ethical Urban Living 2 (1):63-91.
    Certain aspects of our situations often influence us in significant and negative ways, without our knowledge (call this claim “situationism”). One possible explanation of their influence is that they affect our abilities. In this paper, we address two main questions. Do these situational factors rid us of our abilities to act on our sufficient reasons? Do situational factors make it more difficult for us to exercise our abilities to act for sufficient reasons? We argue for the answer ‘sometimes’ to both (...)
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  10.  13
    Haji, Ishtiyaque. Luck’s Mischief: Obligation and Blameworthiness on a Thread.New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 376. $74.00. [REVIEW]Marcela Herdova - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):491-496.
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  11.  35
    Nothing to Fear: Swap Cases and Personal Identity.Marcela Herdova - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):315-337.
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  12.  6
    Review of "Decomposing the Will". [REVIEW]Marcela Herdova - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013:0-0.
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  13. Simply Irresistible: Addiction, Responsibility, and Irresistible Desires.Marcela Herdova - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):196-216.
    In this paper I set out to investigate the claim that addicts lack su cient control over their drug-taking and are thus not morally responsible for it. More speci cally, I evaluate what I call the Simply Irresistible Argument, which proceeds from the claim that addictive desires are irresistible to the conclusion that addicts are not responsible for acting on such desires. I rst propose that we have to disambiguate the notion of an irresistible desire according to temporal criteria, and (...)
     
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  14.  8
    The Importance of Being Ernie.Marcela Herdova - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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