Philosophia Mathematica 10 (2):227-250 (2002)

Dieter Lohmar
University of Cologne
There are two main objections against epistemological foundation of logical principles: 1. Every argument for them must necessarily make use of them. 2. Logical principles cannot be abstracted from experience because they imply elements of meaning that exceed in principle our finite experience (like universality & necessity). In opposition to these objections I argue for Husserl's thesis that logic needs a theory of experience as a foundation. To show the practicability of his attempt I argue that he is able to avoid the two circles mentioned. Motivated by this investigation the Appendix presents some mathematical doubts concerning the proofs by Cantor of the transfiniteness of the set of real numbers.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/10.2.227
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