Down the “Preferred Path”: Dispositional Flexibility Constitutes Phenomenal Character

Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):367-368 (2016)
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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: We agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that phenomeno-physical identities have to be motivated to approach the hard problem of consciousness. We propose that REC will do a better job in motivating these identities if intentionality and phenomenality are considered inseparable. We suggest that the notion of dispositional flexibility motivates these phenomeno-intentional identities and opens up a practical avenue for neurophenomenology.

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Christiane Schreiber
University of Graz

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