- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Emotions, reflection, and moral agency
In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 237--256 (2012)
Abstract
19 pageAuthor's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Analytics
Added to PP
2014-01-27
Downloads
34 (#485,615)
6 months
4 (#862,833)
2014-01-27
Downloads
34 (#485,615)
6 months
4 (#862,833)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
A Cognitive–Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment.Adenekan Dedeke - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 126 (3):437-457.
Skill and Collaboration in the Evolution of Human Cognition.John Sutton - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (1):28-36.
References found in this work
The secret joke of Kant’s soul.Joshua Greene - 2007 - In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press.
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency.Karen Jones - 2003 - In A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 181-200.
Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it?: Reason in moral judgment.Cordelia Fine - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6bfb88b448-rlhnm uwo