Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (1):21-35 (2005)
It has been suggested recently that Heideggers philosophy entails a linguistic idealism because it is committed to the thesis that meaning determines reference. I argue that a careful consideration of the relationship between meaning and signification in Heideggers work does not support the strong sense of determination required by this thesis. By examining Heideggers development of Husserls phenomenology, I show that discourse involves a logic that articulates meaning into significations. Further analysis of Heideggers phenomenological method at work shows that while meaning serves as a condition of possibility of signification in the sense that all possibilities for a terms signification are latent in the meaning of that term, meaning under-determines signification and hence reference. Key Words: discourse language linguistic idealism logic meaning phenomenology signification.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Eclipse of Being: Heidegger on the Question of Being and Nothing and the Ground of Nihilism.Nayère Bani - unknown
Referentiality in Frege and Heidegger.Barbara Fultner - 2005 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (1):37-52.
Heidegger on Meaning and Reference.Cristina Lafont - 2005 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (1):9-20.
Measure-Taking: Meaning and Normativity in Heidegger's Philosophy. [REVIEW]Steven Crowell - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (3):261-276.
Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time.Havi Carel - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4):541 – 556.
Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger.Paola Marrati - 2005 - Stanford University Press.
Ineffability, Signification and the Meaning of Life.Roy W. Perrett - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (2):239-255.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #131,721 of 2,164,828 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,443 of 2,164,828 )
How can I increase my downloads?