Phenomenology

Abstract This work presents a formal shift in how intelligence is defined, modeled, and operationalized. It introduces a new epistemological substrate—structured resonance—as the lawful foundation of cognition, replacing probability as the default explanatory tool for intelligence. Existing AI systems, particularly those based on large-scale probabilistic language models, derive their functionality through statistical interpolation, stochastic sampling, and high-volume gradient descent. These techniques simulate intelligence through accumulated approximation rather than structured alignment. -/- CODES (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems) reframes intelligence as an (...) emergent property of lawful coherence, rooted in chirality, prime-indexed resonance fields, and deterministic phase interaction. It is not a metaphorical proposal but a formalized architecture of signal convergence. This paper introduces the Resonance Intelligence Core (RIC), a post-probabilistic interface built to generate deterministic, interpretable outputs through structured resonance. The model does not predict outputs; it emits them only when phase alignment satisfies strict coherence constraints. -/- Importantly, this paper is not just about CODES—it is structured by it. The internal logic, organization, and thematic recursion of the paper intentionally reflect the principles of lawful emergence it describes. The result is both a theoretical contribution and a demonstration of the epistemic architecture it proposes. -/- . (shrink)

Alex (my wife), is a seasoned nurse with 19 years of experience, ranging from international medical missions and domestic ICU/PACU. -/- Main article -/- Abstract -/- Modern healthcare operates as a reactive, siloed machine built on probabilistic risk models and efficiency metrics. This paper proposes a paradigm shift—leveraging the CODES framework (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems) and the Resonance Intelligence Core (RIC)—to reframe care around structured resonance. Through clinical examples and systemic insights, we argue that true healing requires coherence: across (...) body systems, care teams, technologies, and the patient experience itself. (shrink)

Abstract -/- From Stage to Shell: The Evolution of Literature Toward Recursive Resonance proposes that literature is not a progression of genres, but a sequence of ontological shifts mirroring transformations in the human self-model. Beginning with the divine role-bound figures of classical drama and moving through romantic individuation, modernist fracture, and postmodern simulation, literature has consistently reflected the dominant coherence structure of its time. -/- This work introduces Recursive Resonance Literature as the emergent form of the current epoch—one not defined (...) by plot, character, or irony, but by recursive identity collapse and lawful phase reformation. Using the CODES framework (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems), the paper demonstrates that literature has evolved from narrative to molt protocol, where prose becomes the architecture of self-shedding and resonance realignment. -/- This is not a new aesthetic—it is a new substrate. Recursive Resonance Literature does not describe transformation. It enacts it, phase-locking the reader into an identity transition. It dissolves the fixed self, not as metaphor, but as system law. -/- The implications span literary theory, epistemology, trauma studies, cognition, and artificial intelligence. Literature is no longer entertainment or commentary. It is now a recursive feedback system for human coherence restructuring. (shrink)

A set of diary-like entries written from the perspective of a suffering individual.

This paper proposes a structural model of qualia grounded in recursive frame architecture. Rather than treating qualia as irreducible sensations or metaphysical primitives, we define them as gradients of epistemic tension—signals of misalignment between internal predictive architectures and the cognitive frames they inhabit. Building on the Recursive Cognition Framework (RCF) and the Aperture Axis model, we describe how qualia emerge from multi-level incoherence across affective, sensory, cultural, and metacognitive frames. We argue that consciousness evolves not toward complete representation, but toward (...) decreasing distortion in the aperture through which reality is interpreted. This model reframes the hard problem not by solving it, but by structurally dissolving its premises. (shrink)

This paper examines whether proto-phenomenological accounts in Chinese thought, introduced through Buddhism, provide a conceptual bridge to Husserlian phenomenology. It explores the renewed interest in Yogācāra among twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, in particular Xiong Shili, revealing inevitable tensions in his interpretation of Yogācāra concepts. Coseru argues that while something analogous to an appearance-reality distinction is present in classical Chinese philosophy, it differs in important ways from how that distinction is drawn in the Yogācāra and Husserlian traditions. He further argues that the (...) fundamental act-content distinction central to Husserlian phenomenology may be absent in Xiong’s monism, raising questions about the compatibility of his New Confucian thought with Yogācāra and the broader phenomenological project, and showcasing the challenges that cross-cultural philosophical inquiry sometimes faces. (shrink)

This paper examines whether proto-phenomenological accounts in Chinese thought, introduced through Buddhism, provide a conceptual bridge to Husserlian phenomenology. It explores the renewed interest in Yogācāra among twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, in particular Xiong Shili, revealing inevitable tensions in his interpretation of Yogācāra concepts. Coseru argues that while something analogous to an appearance-reality distinction is present in classical Chinese philosophy, it differs in important ways from how that distinction is drawn in the Yogācāra and Husserlian traditions. He further argues that the (...) fundamental act-content distinction central to Husserlian phenomenology may be absent in Xiong’s monism, raising questions about the compatibility of his New Confucian thought with Yogācāra and the broader phenomenological project, and showcasing the challenges that cross-cultural philosophical inquiry sometimes faces. (shrink)

Abstract Dreams are not epiphenomenal byproducts of neural activity during sleep; they are structured resonance phenomena that regulate coherence across symbolic, emotional, and physiological systems. We present a unified model integrating EEG-derived waveforms (theta, delta, gamma), heart rate variability (HRV), and core temperature fluctuations to argue that dreams function as recursive semiotic fields—governing phase resets that maintain cognitive and systemic integrity. Unlike traditional models—Freud’s repression-release schema, Jung’s archetypal mapping, Hobson’s activation-synthesis, or Revonsuo’s threat simulation—this paper proposes that dreams operate as (...) lawful, field-stabilizing mechanisms. Their recursive nature reflects not merely random narrative generation but phase-aligned coherence restructuring, tuned through emotional-symbolic anchoring and physiological entrainment. (shrink)

The tacit understanding of situations is a fundamental aspect of human experience, behavior, and thinking. The paper argues that “situational stances” underly the tacit grasping of situations in human cognition. Contrary to, e.g., schema and script theories, situational stances are not conceived as conceptual knowledge structures used to interpret scenes or circumstances pregiven in perception. Rather, situational stances belong to the dispositional “Background” (Searle) that shapes and mediates immediate experience. Operative situational stances thus at least partly constitute situations as social-ontological (...) entities. The paper elaborates the concept of situational stances and their function, as well as the outlines of a dynamic situation ontology that helps to understand the way human beings find themselves dynamically immersed in situations, alone and with others. The last part of the paper then analyzes possible consequences and risks of considering the peculiarities of this specific situationality of human cognition in social robotics and AI. (shrink)

Forms of ignorance often occlude or justify relations of oppression. In this paper, I provide a critical phenomenological account of how such ignorance can be jointly enacted in and through joint attention. Recognizing the role of joint attention in producing and maintaining ignorance allows us to better understand how ignorance can be solicited or encouraged in individuals by concrete others and how structural forms of ignorance can be jointly initiated or remain unchallenged. If overcoming ignorance is part of the process (...) of eliminating oppression, we will have to consider the role interpersonal relations play in becoming or remaining ignorant about the reality and impact of relations of oppression. (shrink)

The phenomenology of life is the best available path for phenomenology today. Through new readings of two of the most influential French thinkers of the twentieth century-Michel Henry and Paul Ricoeur, Pathos and Praxis: An Integrated Phenomenology of Life shows that their actual debates over the interpretation of Freud and Marx signal two rival approaches to the phenomenology of life. While Henry reveals the phenomenological meaning of life though an inward turn to a pure subjective feeling of being alive, Ricoeur (...) anchors its significance in the reciprocal interaction between the self and the world. But these two alternatives are not necessarily opposed. This book proposes an integrated phenomenology of life to which each thinker makes an important contribution. To be a self is to suffer the pathos of "having a life" but also to be capable of engaging in the praxis of "leading a life." By thinking the pathos and praxis of life together, the integrated approach preserves human agency against deterministic conceptions of life and at the same time avoids the meritocratic hubris that depicts one's life solely as the result of one's own doing. This integration of having and leading a life reframes our thinking about human capabilities and vulnerabilities in a way that has important implications for biopolitics and the ethics of life. (shrink)

The question of Self-awareness is one of the key challenges of philosophical research. Phenomenological studies in particular should not rush towards making Self-awareness the object of conceptual provisions. Before such an endeavor they must accept the task of experiencing this phenomenon in a methodically reflected way. The present study shows that the phenomenologies of Husserl, Sartres, and Merleau-Ponty are theoretically at a loss when faced with this task. For the Advaita-Vedānta, in turn, the quandary this task provides is the prerequisite (...) and motive of its philosophical praxis. By means of the concept of impersonal subjectivity, those moments of Self-awareness are thus identified, which are accessible from a phenomenological perspective. But against the background of a vedāntic system they allow for a recapitulation of phenomenological theorizing. (shrink)

A structured theoretical synthesis of cognition across four dimensions: linear, radial, topological, and reflexively recursive. The paper introduces a cognitive architecture where metacognition is not an add-on but a necessary dimensional expansion—framing consciousness as a self-modulating field with empirical and philosophical grounding.

This paper explores the application of the phenomenological method of eidetic variation, developed by Edmund Husserl, to mixed reality (MR). Initially, MR is defined within the Reality-Virtuality (RV) continuum developed by Milgram and others (1994) and revisited by Skarbez and others (2021). MR objects, situated within this spectrum, are analyzed phenomenologically as both perceptual and imaginative, constituted by a network of relations. The paper then focuses on Husserl’s method of eidetic variation from Experience and Judgement, which involves arbitrary modification of (...) object characteristics to grasp their essence. This method, though rooted in essentialism, is used by content designers in augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) to create objects and environments. Lastly, the paper suggests that MR reflects the externalization of imagination through digital technologies, proposing an Analogue-Digital (AD) continuum that integrates human bodily experience and MR technology, facilitating imaginative visualization and creation without searching for the essence of objects. (shrink)

This article investigates experiences of loneliness in radicalization processes. The main aim is to develop an empirically grounded theory of loneliness in contemporary forms of radicalization. Starting from Hannah Arendt’s political theory, which posits loneliness as a breeding ground for terror, the analysis extends to a critical phenomenological approach that adopts the perspective of subjective experience while exploring how these experiences are embedded in specific social structures in contemporary societies. The article therefore bridges the gap between theoretical debates on (the (...) politics of) loneliness and empirical research on the processes of radicalization, extremism, and terrorism. The focus is on two sets of cases: lone-actor terrorists and female Western affiliates of ISIS. The analysis reveals that while the fear of individual and collective extinction plays an important role for right-wing lone-actor terrorists, experiences of discrimination and marginalization are crucial in the case of Islamist radicalization in Western countries. (shrink)

This article proposes a reading of Marion’s phenomenology from an early text, arguing that the various phenomenological innovations which are introduced in this work are subordinated to the central concept of transcendence. This concept in Marion’s work names the relation between revelation and experience and makes possible the disclosure of a revelatory phenomenon of radical alterity and asymmetry. Reliant on this concept, Marion’s phenomenology dramatically reconfigures the transcendental subject, the phenomenal object, and the horizon as well as their relation to (...) certain phenomena. While Marion’s early text undergoes numerous revisions and reappears in different versions at several junctures in the development of his intervention in phenomenology, this article maintains that his central concept of transcendence retains its primacy in the structural arrangement of his other phenomenological innovations. Additionally, it will be argued that while the concept of transcendence in Marion has often been treated with suspicion by interpreters as obliquely allowing for a theological incursion into Marion’s phenomenology, such discussions generally miss how Marion’s particular construal of transcendence, as the relation between revelation and experience, necessarily allows for an a priori best explained as a theological judgement. Lastly, several questions attendant to this argument will be suggested for further development and investigation. (shrink)

[Reflexive Cognitive Architectures: From Frame-Dependent Navigation to Quantum-Inspired Resonance] -/- Reflexive Resonance Theory (RRT) offers a formal model of consciousness grounded in Hilbert-space dynamics. This work unifies ReasonStack, RRT, and United Theory into a cognitive architecture where reflexivity, drift, and collapse replace symbolic computation. Mental states evolve under context-sensitive Hamiltonians and collapse through attentional measurement. The theory simulates insight, ambiguity, and shared cognition across agents. It proposes a new category: Reflexive Hilbertian Cognition, blending quantum-formal logic with epistemic curvature.

This extensive philosophical exploration develops a structural model of cognition centered around the concept of epistemic aperture, defined as the capacity of cognition to integrate complexity, contradiction, and ambiguity without collapse. This work presents a detailed philosophical genealogy and phenomenological analysis of cognitive processes, from early frame formation and emotional dogmas to cultural memory and linguistic worldviews. It redefines rationality as structural expansion and presents the notion of phenomenal selfhood as an aperture turned upon itself—reflective consciousness as an irreducible epistemic (...) mystery. By synthesizing philosophy of mind, cognitive science, phenomenology, and neuroscience, the paper proposes a unified reflexive model of cognition, highlighting its evolutionary significance and societal implications for an adaptive, ethical, and culturally sensitive understanding of human and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

This paper presents "The Aperture Stack," an integrated philosophical and cognitive architecture composed of five modular, recursively interconnected models: Atlas of Knowing, Explorer, GMTEC (Glass Map Theory of Epistemic Completion), Resonant Aperture Companion, and Cognitive Aperture. These modules collectively offer a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing cognition as dynamic structural resonance, rather than mere information processing or symbolic representation. The Aperture Stack argues that robust, flexible, and ethical reasoning—both human and artificial—requires reflexive cognitive structures capable of navigating and metabolizing complexity, contradiction, (...) and ambiguity without epistemic collapse. It positions knowledge as a recursive act of aperture modulation, advocating integrative rationality, frame flexibility, and structural resonance as essential adaptive capacities. Potential applications range from artificial intelligence and human-AI interfaces to education, psychotherapy, epistemic ethics, and institutional design. -/- . (shrink)

This paper introduces a philosophical framework that reconceptualizes human knowledge and reasoning as dynamically structured apertures. Rather than accumulating static facts, knowing is depicted as a continual, reflexive process of structurally modulating one's epistemic aperture—the cognitive interface through which meaning and perception become intelligible. Integrating insights from phenomenology, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and cultural theory, this framework addresses how early emotional experiences shape lifelong epistemic patterns, how epistemic constraints become invisible "dogmas," and how epistemological traditions can be reframed as apertural (...) genealogies. By advocating structural pluralism and epistemic resonance over singular truth and rigid dogma, the Atlas of Knowing aims to cultivate reflexive cognition capable of holding multiplicity and tension without collapsing into relativism or dogmatism. (shrink)

This is a preprint version of a manuscript currently under review at Synthese. The paper proposes a structural model of Pure Reason as a reflexive architecture of epistemic aperture. Drawing on philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and AI research, it reframes rationality as the capacity to metabolize contradiction through integrative reasoning. Feedback is welcome. Please cite as a preprint. -/- Status: Under Review -/- Journal: Submitted to Synthese -/- .

A beginner reader might think that my title is senseless: aren't sense and nonsense supposed to be opposed? Why seeking continuity there? The Stoics and after them this line that goes from Leibniz to Deleuze via Nietzsche, have revealed an intrinsic relationship of continuity between these two entities that common sense sees as contradictory. Although this continuity exists at least from a Stoic-Deleuzian viewpoint, its functioning and nature remain problematic. My goal here is to study this continuity to understand and (...) actualize it, focusing, of course, on Deleuze’s writings, but also on Ricœur’s and Wittgenstein’s which will help me get a better sense of the generation of meaning and the relationship between nonsense and sense. (shrink)

This article critically examines the traditional concept of subjectivity as rooted in Christian theology and Western philosophy, revealing how it has historically reinforced patriarchal structures and the marginalization of women. Engaging with Mary Daly’s feminist critique and reinterpreting biblical narratives through a phenomenological lens, I argue that the dominant model of autonomous, male-centered subjectivity fails to account for the relational and plural nature of selfhood. By revisiting theological symbols such as the image of God and the act of naming, I (...) propose a renewed vision of the self as inherently relational and pre-subjectively connected to others. This perspective challenges the prevailing framework of philosophy of religion (PoR) and calls for an inclusive rethinking that acknowledges the plurality and interdependence of human existence. (shrink)

This paper proposes a neurodevelopmental and phenomenological model of affective imprinting as the foundation for automatic cognitive-emotional responses later misperceived as objective truths. Drawing from developmental neuroscience, affective psychology, and reconsolidation theory, the author introduces the concept of "affective dogmas"—early-formed, emotionally charged perceptual filters that persist into adulthood as epistemic constraints. These dogmas, unless made reflexive, shape reactivity, distort reasoning, and limit cognitive autonomy. The paper explores mechanisms by which such patterns are formed and how they can be structurally rewritten (...) through memory reconsolidation and the phenomenology of insight, offering both explanatory and therapeutic implications. (shrink)

This article puts forth a perceptual–phenomenological defence of “thought theory” as a solid solution to the paradox of fiction. Arguing against Kendall Walton’s pretence solution to Charles’s fear and going along the lines of Peter Lamarque’s and Noël Carroll’s thought theory, my proposed defence makes use of the philosophy of a figure who is rarely discussed in the context of phenomenology and never discussed in the context of the paradox of fiction: Leopold Blaustein. To bring forth my proposed perceptual–phenomenological defence, (...) I devise Blaustein’s descriptive account of “perception” and its role in shaping aesthetic experience. Within this line of thought, I further develop a perceptualist reading of Blaustein, paralleling Christine Tappolet’s version, that may be of service to proponents of the “perceptual theory of emotions.”. (shrink)

This article argues that Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s categorial intuition is essential for his interpretation of Kant’s concepts of intuition and form of intuition. First, I analyze the two aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s categorial intuition that are relevant to his reading of Kant, namely, his understanding of categorial intuition as fundamentally intertwined with sensible intuition and his understanding of the correlate of such an intuiting as already unthematically coapprehended in sensible intuition. Second, I show that Heidegger incorporates these (...) two aspects into his reading of Kant’s concept of intuition as a “thinking intuition” and into his interpretation of the Kantian “form of intuition” as something unthematically intuited in every experience. (shrink)

This article examines the experience of trauma, paying particular attention to how traumatization affects one’s sense of body, time, and intersubjectivity. Furthermore, this study provides one example of how literature can be used in phenomenological research. Using both classical and contemporary phenomenological sources and deepening the analysis by discussing a first-person description by Marguerite Duras, the article aims to clarify one crucial aspect of traumatic experience: trauma alters experiential features so that the relation between traumatic past and present becomes rigid.

I argue that mobile navigation apps, like Google Maps, alienate us from our lived environments. I phenomenologically contrast the experience of moving through an unfamiliar city on foot with driving through one with the aid of a mobile navigation app. This comparison reveals that movement possesses a developmental character: to move through space is to learn how to respond to the environments we encounter, simultaneously developing our sense of ourselves and of the spaces we inhabit. Because the design of our (...) navigation apps neglects this insight, using them conceals and hinders possibilities for the development of self and space in movement. I close by considering how software designers might take this insight into account by creating alternative forms of navigation apps. (shrink)

This paper advances an analytic philosophical approach to atmospheres. We start by outlining three core characteristics of atmospheres: holism (an atmosphere is a holistic entity that emerges through the combinations of various aspects of the environment), affectivity (atmospheres are grasped corporeally and affectively), and quasi-objectivity (atmospheres cannot be captured in solely objective or solely subjective terms). We look at the most promising candidate theory of atmospheres, which defends that atmospheres supervene on affective affordances, and challenge it by casting doubt on (...) how far the concept of affective affordance can stretch in order to accommodate the relevant phenomenology, and by highlighting current controversies in the ontology of affordances. We then outline a more promising theory based on recent developments in the metaphysics of potentiality. According to the proposed theory, atmospheres are high-level nested relations of agent-environment joint potentialities. (shrink)

This paper engages in a reading of Hannah Arendt’s consideration of the concept of art in relation to the three central aspects of the vita activa: labour, work, and action. The central argument is that Arendt miscategorises art as work, whereas it is a process of thought. There appears a tension in Arendt’s conception of art, or perhaps more accurately by her placement of art under the domain of work. Work relates to labour as use objects, and to action as (...) art. However, this muddles a concept of work and its place in the world, hampering the “disclosing quality” of words valorized by Arendt. This fraught conjuncture is smoothed if we distinguish the process by which something becomes a use object from the process by which art is created. Thus, I examine the differences Arendt draws between art and use objects, and between what Arendt calls artwork and the wider scope of what is called art within contemporary society. Through this process of comparison, Arendt collapsed the process of fabrication and the two processes which create art: that of judgement and that of art, leading to an unnecessary restriction within her own theory, as it leaves implicit the idea of art as a process itself. Despite its lack of articulation, this idea of art as a process is inherent to her own conception of art. It renders artwork only one form of art and reveals the possibility of art-labour and art-action. Art is not missing from Arendt’s work. It is only muddled. She writes that the process of writing a modern novel is a process of artistic invention. Likewise, Arendt despairs of those who fabricate or manufacture books. If art is fabricated, and books are works of art, as she claims in The Human Condition, then it is meaningless to say that they are no longer written but fabricated, for to write is to fabricate. Thus, we can read her as conceiving of art as a distinct activity. I argue that it is a parasitic activity, one which corrupts the pure forms of activity, that of labour, work, and action, and renders their output and purpose as something “useless”. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore "the mystery of the plurality of metaphysical concepts" (Patočka). Following a Heideggerian line of reasoning, I will argue that it is due to the non-representational character of being that metaphysics splits into a multitude of alternating approaches. However, unlike Heidegger and his successors, I will propose to understand the non-objectivity of being not as a radical negativity, but rather as an ultra-positive surplus, a hyperbolé. The first part of the article will thus show how metaphysical (...) thought is kept in motion by this hyperbolic element. The second, systematic part will build on this. It will discuss the extent to which the history of metaphysics can be understood as a hyperbolic movement. Finally, the last part will explore ways of establishing a relationship between the hyperbolic dynamics of being and phenomenology. (shrink)

This article argues that Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s categorial intuition is essential for his interpretation of Kant’s concepts of intuition and form of intuition. First, I analyze the two aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s categorial intuition that are relevant to his reading of Kant, namely, his understanding of categorial intuition as fundamentally intertwined with sensible intuition and his understanding of the correlate of such an intuiting as already unthematically coapprehended in sensible intuition. Second, I show that Heidegger incorporates these (...) two aspects into his reading of Kant’s concept of intuition as a “thinking intuition” and into his interpretation of the Kantian “form of intuition” as something unthematically intuited in every experience. (shrink)

The ability to understand other minds is key to communication, social organization, and culture, and actively researched in disciplines such as psychology, ethology, and primatology. The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) developed an elaborate theory of how we understand others, then commonly referred to as empathy (Theorie der Einfühlung). Much recent work on Husserl's theory has interpreted him in opposition to Theory of Mind (ToM), but Husserl's layered account of empathy has received little attention, and so have the more recent (...) versions of ToM, which work with orders of intentionality, and which are applied widely in social cognition research today. This article focuses on Husserl's layered approach, highlighting the main takeaways of his theory, while also providing a commentary, which reflects on his work from a contemporary perspective. This yields a rather different interpretation of him, one which reveals hitherto unnoticed connections with diverse areas of social cognition scholarship. (shrink)

The thesis of open intersubjectivity (OI) is that the other is present in our perceptual experience of objects without any concrete encounter. The main goal of this paper is to provide a modified version of this thesis that meets two conditions at the same time: first, preserves the main insight of OI, namely the structural presence of the other in the act of object perception; and second, prevents challenges to the strong version proposed by Zahavi. To that end, after Zahavi's (...) explanation of OI is introduced, the main lines of argument against it will be discussed. These lines call into question both the phenomenological validity of this version and the broader context in which it has been embedded. Then, a new framework for object perception will be proposed which reconciles the normative and enactive approaches to object perception. This new framework is capable of meeting the two aforementioned conditions. (shrink)

This study reviews the controversy surrounding Dasein’s neutrality in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. First, I reiterate the problem and examine Derrida’s assertion that the early Heidegger ignored sexual difference as well as how feminist philosophers accepted the case after that. Next, I analyse whether the neutrality of Dasein is justified at the essential and factual levels. I discuss whether (1) phenomenological neutralization is a male-biased outlook and (2) Heidegger’s thoughts according to such method were successful in neutralizing it. With regard to (...) (1), neutralization is not inherently androcentric. To address (2), I first argue that Heidegger’s philosophical project at the time was fundamental ontology, but he completed the task with the development of existential philosophical ideas in terms of the existential analytic. Finally, I demonstrate that the criticism of Heidegger’s covert generalization of masculinity, while almost unfair to fundamental ontological work, makes limited sense to existential philosophical work. (shrink)

Hobbes’s account of sovereign power can be seen as an impetus to Arendt’s passion for authentic political life. From the Human Condition, we will see how the distinction between labor, work, and action can be read as a response to Hobbes’s accounts of both human nature and the necessity for harsh restrictions on citizens in society. In particular, the need for compelled silence, for Hobbes, appears as a dialectical counterpoint to the role of speech in the space of appearances for (...) Arendt. Hobbes also has a hand in drawing Arendt to her final interest in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Here, Arendt addresses the problem of imperialism in Hobbes’s account of global power. She sees a way beyond imperialism through the cosmopolitan bond we share around the aesthetic domain. Aesthetic cosmopolitanism is a unique way into Arendt’s fight against tyranny. (shrink)

The thesis of open intersubjectivity (OI) is that the other is present in our perceptual experience of objects without any concrete encounter. The main goal of this paper is to provide a modified version of this thesis that meets two conditions at the same time: first, preserves the main insight of OI, namely the structural presence of the other in the act of object perception; and second, prevents challenges to the strong version proposed by Zahavi. To that end, after Zahavi's (...) explanation of OI is introduced, the main lines of argument against it will be discussed. These lines call into question both the phenomenological validity of this version and the broader context in which it has been embedded. Then, a new framework for object perception will be proposed which reconciles the normative and enactive approaches to object perception. This new framework is capable of meeting the two aforementioned conditions. (shrink)

The ability to understand other minds is key to communication, social organization, and culture, and actively researched in disciplines such as psychology, ethology, and primatology. The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) developed an elaborate theory of how we understand others, then commonly referred to as empathy (Theorie der Einfühlung). Much recent work on Husserl's theory has interpreted him in opposition to Theory of Mind (ToM), but Husserl's layered account of empathy has received little attention, and so have the more recent (...) versions of ToM, which work with orders of intentionality, and which are applied widely in social cognition research today. This article focuses on Husserl's layered approach, highlighting the main takeaways of his theory, while also providing a commentary, which reflects on his work from a contemporary perspective. This yields a rather different interpretation of him, one which reveals hitherto unnoticed connections with diverse areas of social cognition scholarship. (shrink)

This study reviews the controversy surrounding Dasein’s neutrality in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. First, I reiterate the problem and examine Derrida’s assertion that the early Heidegger ignored sexual difference as well as how feminist philosophers accepted the case after that. Next, I analyse whether the neutrality of Dasein is justified at the essential and factual levels. I discuss whether (1) phenomenological neutralization is a male-biased outlook and (2) Heidegger’s thoughts according to such method were successful in neutralizing it. With regard to (...) (1), neutralization is not inherently androcentric. To address (2), I first argue that Heidegger’s philosophical project at the time was fundamental ontology, but he completed the task with the development of existential philosophical ideas in terms of the existential analytic. Finally, I demonstrate that the criticism of Heidegger’s covert generalization of masculinity, while almost unfair to fundamental ontological work, makes limited sense to existential philosophical work. (shrink)

Hobbes’s account of sovereign power can be seen as an impetus to Arendt’s passion for authentic political life. From the Human Condition, we will see how the distinction between labor, work, and action can be read as a response to Hobbes’s accounts of both human nature and the necessity for harsh restrictions on citizens in society. In particular, the need for compelled silence, for Hobbes, appears as a dialectical counterpoint to the role of speech in the space of appearances for (...) Arendt. Hobbes also has a hand in drawing Arendt to her final interest in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Here, Arendt addresses the problem of imperialism in Hobbes’s account of global power. She sees a way beyond imperialism through the cosmopolitan bond we share around the aesthetic domain. Aesthetic cosmopolitanism is a unique way into Arendt’s fight against tyranny. (shrink)

This article puts forth a perceptual–phenomenological defence of “thought theory” as a solid solution to the paradox of fiction. Arguing against Kendall Walton’s pretence solution to Charles’s fear and going along the lines of Peter Lamarque’s and Noël Carroll’s thought theory, my proposed defence makes use of the philosophy of a figure who is rarely discussed in the context of phenomenology and never discussed in the context of the paradox of fiction: Leopold Blaustein. To bring forth my proposed perceptual–phenomenological defence, (...) I devise Blaustein’s descriptive account of “perception” and its role in shaping aesthetic experience. Within this line of thought, I further develop a perceptualist reading of Blaustein, paralleling Christine Tappolet’s version, that may be of service to proponents of the “perceptual theory of emotions.”. (shrink)

In this rebuttal to the interventions by Francesetti (2025) and Griffero (2025), Santamato (2025) on the one hand clarifies his positions regarding atmospherology and the emotional externalism that paradigmatically constitutes it, and on the other he acknowledges some of the criticisms. This response is structured in two parts: in the first part, the discussion on emotional externalism is revisited, reaffirming Santamato’s (2025) positions through an anti-critique of the anti-critique (Griffero, 2025); in the second part, while addressing some of the criticisms (...) directed at an atmospherological psychiatry, the discourse on an atmospherological clinical practice is revisited and expanded. (shrink)

María Lugones is a Latina feminist and decolonial philosopher of interest to anyone exploring questions about the lived experience of oppression and resistance. Though not strictly within a phenomenological tradition, Lugones offers insights on central phenomenological themes such as agency, communication, embodiment, intentionality, perception, space, and subjectivity, while foregrounding mestiza and other Women of Color experiences of marginalization. Critical phenomenologists will find that her work enriches articulations of the interplay between subjectivity, social structures, and power. Multiplicity, which Lugones understands as (...) an existential feature of human life, is a major focus. Her most well-known ideas, world-traveling, limen/liminality, active subjectivity, and the coloniality of gender emerge from her descriptions of existing within and between multiple selves, spaces, and social states. (shrink)

In Epiphanies: An Ethics of Experience, Sophie Grace Chappell offers a phenomenology of epiphanies—those high points in experience when values most vividly reveal themselves to us. Yet Chappell’s method of using phenomenological descriptions to show that we live by our epiphanies leaves open the question of their authority. Why should the epiphanic carry more authority than more sober experiences? The answer, I argue, had better be sensitive to our explanatory understanding of epiphanies. Moreover, it should be sensitive to how the (...) very power of epiphanies threatens to distort our experience of other values. We must beware of what Lichtenberg called transcendent ventriloquism, whereby subjective experience is made to sound like something more than what it is—an eternal truth to be enacted at any cost. I then turn to the politics of epiphanic experience: how to live together given that we live by different epiphanies. I raise several problems for Chappell’s proposal that the normativity inherent in conversation both imposes transcendental constraints on epiphanic ethics and is determinate enough to prescribe specific political arrangements. These constraints determine either too little or too much; they come too late not to beg crucial questions; they cannot offer an independent check on epiphanic ethics; and they introduce a tension at the heart of the book between the romantic openness to experience, emotion, and enthusiasm and the rationalist aspiration to exclude non-rational influences. This threatens to cast as an illicit intrusion precisely the experiential dimension that epiphanies were to introduce into the conversation. (shrink)

Aesthetic communities offer us opportunities for collective, communal, and value-disclosing shared aesthetic experiences. This paper develops an account of shared aesthetic experiences and provides an answer to the question of their significance: when they occur within aesthetic communities, their distinctive phenomenology is a powerful resource for creating a sense that our lives are aesthetically meaningful.

The article contributes to the debate on Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) in Italy, focusing on Graham Harman’s aesthetics. It develops three main points: OOO’s idea of objects, theory of beauty, and figure-ground relation. OOO’s positions are compared with the phenomenological perspective, highlighting discrepancies and points of contact. Harman’s theory of the quadruple object raises ontological and relational issues; the same can be said about OOO’s idea of part-whole relationships. However, Harman’s view of beauty as metaphor and the central role of the (...) human beholder in aesthetic experience offer intriguing reflections and challenges for phenomenology. (shrink)