The Price of Frankfurt’s Compatibalism

Journal of Philosophical Research 27:577-584 (2002)
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In this paper I argue that there is an inherent difficulty in Frankfurt’s theory of moral responsibility. After developing Frankfurt’s account of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility complete with its thesis that the causes of our actions are irrelevant for moral responsibility, I discuss his notion of “real want,” “identification,” and personhood in search of his account of the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. I conclude by arguing that there is a tension betweenFrankfurt’s notion of a person (and thus his notion of moral responsibility) and Frankfurtian causal irrelevance



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