An Ethical Interpretation of the Nash Choice Rule

Theory and Decision 49 (2):151-157 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper provides an ethical intepretation of the Nash choice rule. In a setting in which (cardinal) utilities are interpersonally comparable, this procedure is characterised by an impartiality requirement and by the assumption that choices are not responsive to the agents' relative ability to convert resources into utility

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References found in this work

Some formal models of grading principles.Patrick Suppes - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3-4):284 - 306.
Interpersonal comparisons of utility: Why and how they are and should be made.Peter J. Hammond - 1991 - In Jon Elster & John E. Roemer (eds.), Interpersonal comparisons of well-being. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 200--254.

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