In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press (2019)
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Abstract |
Dworkin’s famous argument from legal disagreements poses a problem for legal
positivism by undermining the idea that the law can be (just) the result of the practice
and attitudes of norm-applying officials. In recent work, the chapter author argued that a
hybrid contextualist theory paired with a dispositional theory of value—a hybrid
dispositionalism, for short—offers the resources to respond to similar disagreement-
based arguments in other evaluative and normative domains. This chapter claims that the theory the author advocates can extend to legal statements and disputes, and shares some important features with Toh’s (2011) idea that legal statements express shared acceptance of norms. The chapter proposes that a contextualist semantics for legal statements paired with the pragmatic communication of implicatures that express shared acceptances of norms, achieves the same goal that Toh aims at.
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Keywords | Dworkin legal disagreement legal positivism semantic contextualism value dispositions expressivism generalized conversational implicatures plural norm acceptance |
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
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