Why zombies are inconceivable

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90 (2004)
Abstract
I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they _must_ involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, _cannot_. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess
Keywords Functionalism  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Thought Experiment  Zombie
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DOI 10.1080/713659880
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Destabilizing the Knowledge Argument and Modal Argument.Amber Ross - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.

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