Why zombies are inconceivable

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90 (2004)

Authors
Eric Marcus
Auburn University
Abstract
I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they _must_ involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, _cannot_. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess
Keywords Functionalism  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Thought Experiment  Zombie
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DOI 10.1080/713659880
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References found in this work BETA

Does Conceivability Entail Possibility.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):594-597.
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism.Stephan Leuenberger - 2008 - In D. W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 4--145.
What Does the Zombie Argument Prove?Miklós Márton - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):271-280.
We ’Re All Infected: Legal Personhood, Bare Life and The Walking Dead‘.Mitchell Travis - 2015 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 28 (4):787-800.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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