A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity

Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421 (2002)
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Abstract

It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered.

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2006

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10.1007/bf02379921

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Ari Maunu
University of Turku

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege (ed.) - 1979 - Blackwell.
Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy.Gottlob Frege - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Brian McGuinness.

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