History of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1):65 - 79 (1991)

Richard McCarty
East Carolina University
After distinguishing three criteria of adequacy for any acceptable moral theory's treatment of moral conflict, or conflicts of duties, I explain how Kant's ethics can satisfy all three. Although Kant denies the possibility of conflicting duties, he does allow conflicting "grounds of obligation." I develop a new interpretation of such conflicts, rejecting one proposed earlier by Onora O'Neill
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