On a Puzzle About Experts, Screening-Off and the Rarity of Defeat

Abstract

We introduce a ``rarity of defeat'' principle, valid in cases of deference to an expert, to address intuitions involved in a puzzle of Nissan-Rozen concerning epistemic deference and evidential screening-off.

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Randall G. McCutcheon
University of Memphis

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