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A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument 1
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159 (2008)
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Citations of this work
Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
The objects of moral responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.
What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.
References found in this work
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
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