Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility

Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Responsibility, control, and omissions.John Martin Fischer - 1997 - The Journal of Ethics 1 (1):45-64.
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.
Moral Responsibility and Motivational Mechanisms.James D. Steadman - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):473 - 492.
My way: essays on moral responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Responsibility and control.John Martin Fischer - 1982 - Journal of Philsophy 79 (January):24-40.
Control, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
202 (#94,123)

6 months
12 (#157,869)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael McKenna
University of Arizona

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Freedom Within Reason.Susan R. Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.
Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.

View all 24 references / Add more references