Abstract

Having shown the structural affinities between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason, the dissertation takes up the interpretative issue of the "primacy of practical reason." This results in a demonstration that primacy rests upon the importance Kant gave to the spontaneous subject as the determining ground of a priori knowledge. Primacy, then, rests upon the fact that in action, the cognition of this self-active subject is possible. Finally, primacy is directly related to the fact that in action reason's interest in the unconditioned is exhibited. ;This dissertation is a reconstruction of Kant's system of the primacy of practical reason. The reconstruction bases the meaning of "primacy" in the existence of the self-active subject of the second Critique as the Bestimmungsgrund of action, of practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. The reconstruction proceeds first methodologically and then interpretatively. ;Methodologically models for transcendental arguments, transcendental frameworks and transcendental deduction are articulated expansively enough to explicate the Critique of Practical Reason as a technically rigorous transcendental work. The models used in analyzing the "Analytic" of the second Critique demonstrate the necessity for grounding the unity of the practical phenomenal manifold in the spontaneity of the subject. The resulting unity is an individuated self cognized as a unitary will with a manifold of desire idiosyncratic to it. Such a subject is demonstrated to be dependent upon the constitution of a free and universal subject by virtue of the fact that only through Wille is Willkur possible, since only Wille can provide an a priori organizing principle for cognizing volition