Abstract

THIS PAPER ARGUES, AGAINST A. O. LOVEJOY AND WITH R. B.\nPERRY, THAT JAMES' THEORY OF MEANING DOES NOT CONFUSE\nCONSEQUENCES OF BELIEVING AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE\nSTATEMENTS BELIEVED. RATHER, I ARGUE THAT JAMES HOLDS THAT\nTHE MEANING OF A SYNTHETIC STATEMENT IS TO BE FOUND IN ITS\nPERCEPTUAL CONSEQUENCES WHILE CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEVING ARE\nRELEVANT TO 'JUSTIFYING' OVERBELIEFS; THAT IS, TO\nJUSTIFYING MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS FOR WHICH THE EVIDENCE IS\nINSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL, NON-PASSIONAL\nJUSTIFICATION. ALTHOUGH THIS THEORY OF MEANING APPEARS\nANTI-METAPHYSICAL, JAMES DOES NOT USE IT TO RULE OUT\nMETAPHYSICS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES, ALONG WITH COMMON SENSE,\nTHAT METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES ARE MEANINGFUL; THUS, THE\nQUESTION IS WHAT METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES MEAN AND NOT\nWHETHER THEY ARE MEANINGFUL. ALTHOUGH JAMES IS OFTEN\nMISLEADING IN TALKING ABOUT MEANING, I ARGUE THAT THIS\nINTERPRETATION IS SUPPORTED BY HIS NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS OF\nMETAPHYSICS. PAUL HENLE'S ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A FAVORABLE\nINTERPRETATION OF JAMES WITHIN LOVEJOY'S FRAMEWORK, IS ALSO\nSHOWN TO BE INCOHERENT