Towards a new standard model of concepts?

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Guy Dove’s book is about the puzzle of how our minds can represent and process abstract concepts. Abstract concepts have posed a problem for the influential view of the embodied mind and grounded c...

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10.1080/09515089.2023.2177144

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Christian Michel
VU University Amsterdam

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References found in this work

Overcoming the modal/amodal dichotomy of concepts.Christian Michel - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):655-677.
The Liar Paradox in the predictive mind.Christian Michel - 2020 - Pragmatics and Cognition 26 (2-3):239-266.
The Liar Paradox in the predictive mind.Christian Michel - 2019 - Pragmatics Cognition 26 (2-3):239-266.
The Liar Paradox in the predictive mind.Christian Michel - 2019 - Pragmatics and Cognition 26 (2-3):239-266.

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