The collective epistemic reasons of social-identity groups

Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-20 (2022)
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In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship—on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.



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Veli Mitova
University of Johannesburg