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Correction to: An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti
Axiomathes 29 (5):529-529 (2019)
Abstract
In the Introduction section, 6th point under the paragraph “Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 63–64):….. should read as (6) Scientific antirealism is a philosophical theory.Author's Profile
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