Related categories

143 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 143
  1. The "Vital and Historical Reason" of José Ortega y Gasset.Felix Alluntis - 1955 - Franciscan Studies 15 (1):60-78.
  2. Can a Historian of Science Be a Scientific Realist?Theodore Arabatzis - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S531-.
    In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces problems. Finally, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Going Local: A Defense of Methodological Localism About Scientific Realism.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Scientific realism and anti-realism are most frequently discussed as global theses: theses that apply equally well across the board to all the various sciences. Against this status quo I defend the localist alternative, a methodological stance on scientific realism that approaches debates on realism at the level of individual sciences, rather than at science itself. After identifying the localist view, I provide a number of arguments in its defense, drawing on the diversity and disunity found in the sciences, as well (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Harm to the Unconceived.Michael D. Bayles - 1976 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (3):292-304.
  5. The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo.Michael A. Bishop - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
    Scientific realism says of our best scientific theories that (1) most of their important posits exist and (2) most of their central claims are approximately true. Antirealists sometimes offer the pessimistic induction in reply: since (1) and (2) are false about past successful theories, they are probably false about our own best theories too. The contemporary debate about this argument has turned (and become stuck) on the question, Do the central terms of successful scientific theories refer? For example, Larry Laudan (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6. P. Kyle Stanford. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Xi + 234 Pp., Bibl., Index. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. $45. [REVIEW]Ingo Brigandt - 2007 - Isis 98 (2):435-436.
  7. No New Miracles, Same Old Tricks.Jacob Busch - 2008 - Theoria 74 (2):102-114.
    Abstract: Laudan (1984) distinguishes between two senses of success for scientific theories: (i) that a particular theory is successful, and (ii) that the methods for picking out approximately true theories are successful. These two senses of success are reflected in two different ways that the no miracles argument for scientific realism (NMA) may be set out. First, I set out a (traditional) version of NMA that considers the success of particular theories. I then consider a more recent formulation of NMA (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  8. Entity Realism Meets the Pessimistic Meta-Induction – The World is Not Enough.Jacob Busch - 2006 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (106):26.
    In the following I briefly set out Devitt's (1997) definition of entity realism and compare it to Hacking's (1983) definition. I then set out the pessimistic induction argument as suggested by Putnam (1978). I present an argument developed by Bertolet (1988) to the effect that Devitt's abductive defence of realism fails. In the light of its failure, Devitt offers the ability of his definition of scientific realism to solve the pessimistic induction argument as a tactical advantage for his definition. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Entity Realism Meets the Pessimistic Meta-Induction Argument. The World is Not Enough.Jacob Busch - 2006 - SATS 7 (2).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Why Postulate That the Number of Unconceived Scientific Alternatives is Finite?Susan V. H. Castro - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):29-33.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. What You Don’T Know Can’T Hurt You: Realism and the Unconceived.Anjan Chakravartty - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):149-158.
    Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  12. Drawing Philosophical Lessons From Perrin's Experiments on Brownian Motion: A Response to van Fraassen.A. Chalmers - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):711-732.
    In a recent article, van Fraassen has taken issue with the use to which Perrin’s experiments on Brownian motion have been put by philosophers, especially those defending scientific realism. He defends an alternative position by analysing the details of Perrin’s case in its historical context. In this reply, I argue that van Fraassen has not done the job well enough and I extend and in some respects attempt to correct his claims by close attention to the historical details.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  13. Scientific Realism and the Divide Et Impera Strategy: The Ether Saga Revisited.Alberto Cordero - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1120-1130.
  14. Rejected Posits, Realism, and the History of Science.Alberto Cordero - unknown
    Summary: Responding to Laudan’s skeptical reading of history an influential group of realists claim that the seriously wrong claims past successful theories licensed were not really implicated in the predictions that once singled them out as successful. For example, in the case of Fresnel’s theory of light, it is said that although he appealed to the ether he didn’t actually need to in order to derive his famous experimental predictions—in them, we are assured, the ether concept was “idle,” “inessential,” “peripheral” (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Scientific Realism and the Case of Weak Interactions.Elise Crull - unknown
    Advocates of scientic realism typically respond to the challenge of the pessimistic meta-induction by turning to the history of science. The episode most frequently discussed is the shift from Fresnel's wave theory of light to Maxwell's electromagnetism. This particular history is taken to represent one of the hardest problems for the realist, for while it exhibits continuity on the empirical level, it simultaneously represents a dramatic shift in ontology. Thus, various authors have proposed methods for defeating the pessimistic meta-induction based (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. The No Alternatives Argument.Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):213-234.
    Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  17. Realism and the Absence of Rivals.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2427-2446.
    Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18. The Pessimistic Meta-Induction. A Response to Jacob Busch.Michael Devitt - 2006 - SATS 7 (2):127-135.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta‐Induction.Gerald Doppelt - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):96-118.
    This paper develops a stronger version of ‘inference-to-the-best explanation’ scientific realism. I argue against three standard assumptions of current realists: realism is confirmed if it provides the best explanation of theories’ predictive success ; the realist claim that successful theories are always approximately true provides the best explanation of their success ; and realists are committed to giving the same sort of truth-based explanation of superseded theories’ success that they give to explain our best current theories’ success. On the positive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  20. Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Matthias Egg - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):115-141.
    I argue that scientific realism, insofar as it is only committed to those scientific posits of which we have causal knowledge, is immune to Kyle Stanford’s argument from unconceived alternatives. This causal strategy is shown not to repeat the shortcomings of previous realist responses to Stanford’s argument. Furthermore, I show that the notion of causal knowledge underlying it can be made sufficiently precise by means of conceptual tools recently introduced into the debate on scientific realism. Finally, I apply this strategy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  21. 6 The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Matthias Egg - 2014 - In Scientific Realism in Particle Physics: A Causal Approach. De Gruyter. pp. 79-102.
  22. P. Kyle Stanford Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Patrick Enfield - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):881-895.
  23. Scientific Realism and the History of Science.Michael Esfeld - 2005 - Philosophy 1:1-15.
    The paper considers the two main challenges to scientific realism, stemming from confirmation holism and the underdetermination thesis as well as from semantic holism and the incommensurability thesis. Against the first challenge, it is argued that there are other criteria besides agreement with experience that enable a rational evaluation of competing theories. Against the second challenge, it is argued that at most a thesis of local incommensurability can be defended that is compatible with a minimal version of scientific realism, namely (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Berkeley on Conceiving the Unconceived.J. D. G. Evans - 1985 - Irish Philosophical Journal 2 (2):79-93.
  25. Theory Change and Degrees of Success.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1283-1292.
    Scientific realism is the position that success of a scientific theory licenses an inference to its approximate truth. The argument from pessimistic meta-induction maintains that this inference is undermined due to the existence of theories from the history of science that were successful, but false. I aim to counter pessimistic meta-induction and defend scientific realism. To do this, I adopt a notion of success that admits of degrees, and show that our current best theories enjoy far higher degrees of success (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  26. Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science1.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2009 - In Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag. pp. 11--95.
  27. Epistemic Instrumentalism, Exceeding Our Grasp.Arthur Fine - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139.
    In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived alternatives. This response, called "epistemic instrumentalism", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case of exceeding our grasp.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Author-Meets-Critics: Exceeding Our Grasp by Kyle Stanford.Arthur Fine, Peter Godfrey-Smith & Anjan Chakravartty - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1).
  29. A Defense of the Pessimistic Metainduction.Daian Tatiana Flórez Quintero - 2012 - Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (20):169 - 185.
  30. Forever Beyond Our Grasp?Patrick Forber - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):135-141.
    Does science successfully uncover the deep structure of the natural world? Or are the depths forever beyond our epistemic grasp? Since the decline of logical positivism and logical empiricism, scientific realism has become the consensus view: of course our scientific theories apprehend the deep structure of the world. What else could explain the remarkable success of science? This is the explanationist defense of scientific realism, the “ultimate argument.” Kyle Stanford starts here and, using the history of theorizing about biological inheritance (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  31. Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist Be a Stanfordite?Greg Frost-Arnold - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific critique of realism? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, Stanford’s challenge, based on the problem of unconceived alternatives, cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism: superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist Be a Stanfordite?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2014 - Synthese:1-17.
    Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific version of this view, based on the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, Stanford’s challenge cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism, namely: superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. The Problem of How to Evaluate Scientific Theories.Germán Guerrero Pino - 2008 - Discusiones Filosóficas 9 (12):37 - 56.
  34. P. Kyle Stanford:Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives,:Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.David Harker - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (2):251-253.
  35. A Note on “The No Alternatives Argument” by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):375-384.
    The defence of The No Alternatives Argument in a recent paper by R. Dawid, S. Hartmann and J. Sprenger rests on the assumption that the number of acceptable alternatives to a scientific hypothesis is independent of the complexity of the scientific problem. This note proves a generalisation of the main theorem by Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger, where this independence assumption is no longer necessary. Some of the other assumptions are also discussed, and the limitations of the no-alternatives argument are explored.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. A Limited Defense of the Pessimistic Induction.Jesse Hobbs - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):171-191.
    The inductive argument from the falsity of most past scientific theories (more than 100 years old) to the falsity of most present ones is defensible, I argue, if it is modified to account for the degrees of theoreticity or observationality in such theories, and the extent to which they are hedged. The case of descriptive astronomy is examined to show that most of the true theories of the 1890s were high in observationality and/or significantly hedged. The false theories of that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. A Defense of the Suppositionalist View of Hypothetical Entities.Jonathon Daniel Hricko - 2013 - Dissertation,
    When scientists put forward hypotheses, they sometimes involve new kinds of entities, which we can call 'hypothetical entities.' Hypothetical entities are pervasive in the sciences, and some examples include caloric and, up until very recently, the Higgs boson. Some hypothetical entities are discovered, as was the case with the Higgs boson, while scientists conclude that others, like caloric, do not exist. Hypothetical entities pose a number of important challenges for the philosophy of science, and my goal is to develop and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Building on Sellars: Concept Formation and Scientific Realism. [REVIEW]Tanya Kelley - 2008 - Metascience 17 (2):257-259.
    Harold Brown has written an ambitious work, which traces the formation of concepts in individuals and cultures, examines case studies of concepts in calculus, mathematics, biology and related fields, summarises important philosophical works on the theory of concepts, and seeks to reconcile scientific realism with conceptual change. Brown considers himself a scientific realist but concedes that this very label is one that depends on a long history of concepts that came before, and may indeed be superseded as conceptual change continues. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Nowa indukcja a nowy realizm.Mateusz Kotowski - 2015 - Filo-Sofija 29:65-78.
    P. Kyle Stanford formulated his New Induction over the History of Science in order to show that underdetermination of scientific theories by evidence is a genuine problem of scientific theorizing about the world and a one that all scientific realists should take seriously. His argument uses historical record to show that because successful theories of the past were typically, in the light of the then available evidence, underdetermined by theories which we could not at the time conceive, we should expect (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. O pesymistycznej indukcji.Mateusz Kotowski - 2013 - Lectiones and Acroases Philosophicae (1):131-148.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. The Unexpected Realist.William H. Krieger & Brian L. Keeley - 2006 - In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge University Press.
    There are two ways to do the unexpected. The banal way—let's call it the expectedly unexpected—is simply to chart the waters of what is and is not done, and then set out to do something different. For a philosopher, this can be done by embracing a method of non sequitor or by perhaps inverting some strongly held assumption of the field. The more interesting way— the unexpectedly unexpected—is to transform the expectations themselves; to do something new and contextualize it in (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Feyerabend's ‘The Concept of Intelligibility in Modern Physics’ (1948).Daniel Kuby - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 57:57–63.
    This essay introduces the transcription and translation of Paul Feyerabend's "Der Begriff der Verständlichkeit in der modernen Physik" [The concept of intelligibility in modern physics] (1948), which is an early essay written by Paul Feyerabend in 1948 on the topic of intelligibility (Verständlichkeit) and visualizability (Anschaulichkeit) of physical theories. The existence of such essay was likely. It is listed in his bibliography as his first publication. Yet the content of the essay was unknown, as no original or copy is extant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, by P. Kyle Stanford.A. Kukla - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):243-246.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy.M. Lange - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):281-285.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  45. Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy.Marc Lange - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):281–285.
    Among the niftiest arguments for scientific anti-realism is the ‘pessimistic induction’ (also sometimes called ‘the disastrous historical meta-induction’). Although various versions of this argument differ in their details (see, for example, Poincare 1952: 160, Putnam 1978: 25, and Laudan 1981), the argument generally begins by recalling the many scientific theories that posit unobservable entities and that at one time or another were widely accepted. The anti-realist then argues that when these old theories were accepted, the evidence for them was quite (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  46. A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
    This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms of scientific (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   252 citations  
  47. Predictive Success, Partial Truth and Skeptical Realism.Gauvain Leconte - unknown
    Realists argue that mature theories enjoying predictive success are approximately and partially true, and that the parts of the theory necessary to this success are retained through theory-change and worthy of belief. I examine the paradigmatic case of the novel prediction of a white spot in the shadow of a circular object, drawn from Fresnel's wave theory of light by Poisson in 1819. It reveals two problems in this defence of realism: predictive success needs theoretical idealizations and fictions on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy.Peter J. Lewis - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):371--380.
    Putnam and Laudan separately argue that the falsity of past scientific theories gives us reason to doubt the truth of current theories. Their arguments have been highly influential, and have generated a significant literature over the past couple of decades. Most of this literature attempts to defend scientific realism by attacking the historical evidence on which the premises of the relevant argument are based. However, I argue that both Putnam's and Laudan's arguments are fallacious, and hence attacking their premises is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  49. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.John Losee - 1972 - Oxford University Press.
    This new edition brings up to date this accessible study of the philosophy of science. Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, scientists and philosophers have raised questions about the proper evaluation of scientific interpretations. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science is an exposition of differing viewpoints on issues such as the distinction between scientific inquiry and other types of interpretation, the relationship between theories and observation reports; the evaluation of competing theories; and the nature of progress in (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   46 citations  
  50. A Historically Informed Modus Ponens Against Scientific Realism: Articulation, Critique, and Restoration.Timothy D. Lyons - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):369-392.
    There are two primary arguments against scientific realism, one pertaining to underdetermination, the other to the history of science. While these arguments are usually treated as altogether distinct, P. Kyle Stanford's ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ constitutes one kind of synthesis: I propose that Stanford's argument is best understood as a broad modus ponens underdetermination argument, into which he has inserted a unique variant of the historical pessimistic induction. After articulating three criticisms against Stanford's argument and the evidence that he offers, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 143