Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):632-633 (2004)

Barbara Gail Montero
CUNY Graduate Center
Ross & Spurrett (R&S) fail to take metaphysics seriously because they do not make a clear enough distinction between how we understand the world and what the world is really like. Although they show that the behavioral and cognitive sciences are genuinely explanatory, it is not clear that they have shown that these special sciences identify properties that are genuinely causal.
Keywords Mind
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x04280141
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