Carnap and Quine: Analyticity, Naturalism, and the Elimination of Metaphysics

The Monist 101 (4):394-416 (2018)

Authors
Sean Morris
Metropolitan State University of Denver
Abstract
Rudolf Carnap is well known for his attack on metaphysics, and W. V. Quine is equally well known for his attack on Carnap’s analytic/synthetic distinction. Receiving far less attention is their basic agreement that a properly scientific approach to philosophy should eliminate the metaphysical excesses of the past. This paper aims to remedy this. It focuses initially on the development of Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics from 1932 to 1950 and the role that analyticity plays. It then turns to Quine, emphasizing his basic agreement with Carnap over the elimination of metaphysics and what this looks like without the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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DOI 10.1093/monist/ony014
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Reason, Truth and History.Michael Devitt & Hilary Putnam - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):274.
Carnapian Rationality.A. Carus - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):163-184.
Carnap's Metaontology.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):229-249.

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