Abstract
The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining
whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes”
decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or
“non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the
details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a detailed
investigation of what we will call the “Simple Stakes Thesis”. The Simple Stakes Thesis, as it
will turn out, is too simple. For even if the stakes associated with a specific one-off decision
are low—and hence does not engender a right to an explanation—such decisions may
nevertheless form part of a high stakes pattern or aggregate of decisions. In such cases, we
argue, even a low stakes decision may engender a right to explanation. Not only does this
show that the right to explanation is more demanding than so far recognized. It also shows
that the stakes thesis is significantly harder to apply in practice.