Four arguments that the cognitive psychology of religion undermines the justification of religious belief

Michael Murray
Franklin and Marshall College
Over the last decade a handful of cognitive models of religious belief have begun to coalesce in the literature. Attempts to offer “scientific explanations of religious belief ” are nothing new, stretching back at least as far as David Hume, and perhaps as far back as Cicero. What is also not new is a belief that scientific explanations of religious belief serve in some way to undermine the justification for those beliefs.
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The Natural Foundations of Religion.Mark Collier - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):665-680.

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