Four arguments that the cognitive psychology of religion undermines the justification of religious belief

Abstract

Over the last decade a handful of cognitive models of religious belief have begun to coalesce in the literature. Attempts to offer “scientific explanations of religious belief ” are nothing new, stretching back at least as far as David Hume, and perhaps as far back as Cicero. What is also not new is a belief that scientific explanations of religious belief serve in some way to undermine the justification for those beliefs.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,466

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
82 (#146,925)

6 months
1 (#417,474)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Murray
Franklin and Marshall College

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references