Success semantics: the sequel

Philosophical Studies 165 (1):151-165 (2013)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to reinterpret success semantics, a theory of mental content, according to which the content of a belief is fixed by the success conditions of some actions based on this belief. After arguing that in its present form, success semantics is vulnerable to decisive objections, I examine the possibilities of salvaging the core of this proposal. More specifically, I propose that the content of some very simple, but very important, mental states, the immediate mental antecedents of action, can be explained in this manner
Keywords Mental content  Success semantics  Modest naturalism  Action-guiding representations
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9922-7
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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