Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way

Metaphysica 22 (2):263-283 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a psychological continuity theorist. But I am also in a sense, a biological theorist.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Towards an Animalist Conception of Personal Identity.Keith Hess - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
What the Remnant Person Problem Really Implies.Joungbin Lim - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):667-687.
O Problema da Identidade Pessoal: Uma Defesa do Animalismo.Hugo Luzio - 2022 - Dissertation, School of Arts and Humanities of the University of Lisbon
Persistence Without Personhood: A New Model.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):346-364.
Animalism versus lockeanism: No contest.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):369-376.
¿Yo soy una persona?David Villena Saldaña - 2010 - Analítica 4 (4):55-67.
What Am I?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:185-193.
Review of Eric Olson: The Human Animal. [REVIEW]Tamar Szabó Gendler - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):112-115.
Animalism and Person Essentialism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-10-10

Downloads
115 (#158,876)

6 months
35 (#103,058)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Harold Noonan
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - New York: Routledge.
Reference and generality.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press. Edited by Michael C. Rea.
Sameness and substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 42 references / Add more references