Geach, Aristotle and Predicate Logics

Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):96-114 (2015)
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Abstract

Geach's account of the Aristotelian logic of categorical sentences supplemented the views shared by Frege, Russell, Quine and others. I argue that this particular predicate logic approach and Geach's points apply to only one variety of natural language categorical sentences. For example, it takes the universal categorical as a universal conditional “If anything is a man, then it is mortal”. A different natural language form can and should be invoked: “Every man is a mortal.” Employing special restricted quantifiers in a version of predicate logic, we justify a full square of opposition and the rules of quality and quantity that Geach rejected

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Alex Orenstein
CUNY Graduate Center

References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Reference and generality.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press. Edited by Michael C. Rea.
Methods of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1952 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Beginning Logic.Sarah Stebbins - 1965 - London, England: Hackett Publishing.
Reference and Generality.Peter Geach - 1962 - Studia Logica 15:301-303.

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