Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):96-114 (2015)

Alex Orenstein
CUNY Graduate Center
Geach's account of the Aristotelian logic of categorical sentences supplemented the views shared by Frege, Russell, Quine and others. I argue that this particular predicate logic approach and Geach's points apply to only one variety of natural language categorical sentences. For example, it takes the universal categorical as a universal conditional “If anything is a man, then it is mortal”. A different natural language form can and should be invoked: “Every man is a mortal.” Employing special restricted quantifiers in a version of predicate logic, we justify a full square of opposition and the rules of quality and quantity that Geach rejected
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DOI 10.1111/phin.12077
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Generality.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Methods of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1950 - Harvard University Press.
Beginning Logic.E. J. Lemmon - 1965 - Thomas Nelson and Sons.
Reference and Generality.W. V. Quine - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):100.

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