Popper's Flirt with Dogmatism

Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 41 (2):179-200 (2019)
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Abstract

At various occasions Popper states that in order for a theory to show its strength “certain amount” of dogmatism must precede the critical testing phase. He even argues that dogmatism is a necessary precondition of criticism. These are alarming statements, undermining Popper’s methodological imperative of falsification. Critical rationalism is based on a strict opposition to dogmatism for logical reasons, for evolutionary reasons, and for ideological reasons. Popper cannot provide any objective criterion defining the proper dosage of dogmatism and thus opens doors to its uncontrolled expansion. Criticism thus ceases to be the non-negotiable normative principle and the inviolable standard of rationality.

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Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?T. S. Kuhn - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 22.
Normal science and its dangers.Karl Popper - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 51--8.
Consolations for the Specialist.Paul Feyerabend - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 197.
Against'normal science'.John Wn Watkins - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.
Ratio Negativa—The Popperian Challenge.Zuzana Parusniková - 2009 - In Zuzana Parusniková & Robert S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper. London: Springer. pp. 31--45.

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