Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases", "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence plays the central role in fixing mental content and ruling out deviant interpretations. However I point out a huge unnoticed problem, the problem of evidence: Lewis really has no theory of sensory content and hence no theory of what fixes evidence. I suggest a way of plugging this hole in Lewis's theory. On the resulting theory, which I call " phenomenal functionalism", there is a sense in which sensory phenomenology is the source of all determinate intentionality. Phenomenal functionalism has similarities to the theories of Chalmers and Schwitzgebel

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-02-10

Downloads
1,260 (#9,595)

6 months
180 (#16,868)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Pautz
Brown University

References found in this work

The Primacy of the Mental.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):31-41.

Add more references