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Profile: Adam Pautz
Profile: Adam Pautz (Brown University)
  1.  71
    Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.
  2. Consciousness: A Simple Approach.Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
     
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  3. What Are the Contents of Experiences?Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.
    I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
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  4. Propositions and Properties.Adam Pautz - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):478-486.
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  5. Experiences Are Representations: An Empirical Argument (Forthcoming Routledge).Adam Pautz - forthcoming - In Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge.
    In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.
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  6. Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.
    H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness.
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  7. A Simple View of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau’s worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are ’reference magnets’.
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  8. Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.
    I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases", "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence plays the central role in fixing mental content and ruling out deviant interpretations. (...)
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  9. Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
  10.  62
    What is My Evidence That Here is a Cup?Adam Pautz - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):915-927.
    This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification.
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  11.  95
    Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?Adam Pautz - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.
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  12. Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?Adam Pautz - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
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  13. Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
    Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can (...)
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  14. The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality.Adam Pautz - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):250-272.
    I address a second issue that arises once we accept intentionalism: can intentionalists accept the claim of Horgan and Tienson (among others) that phenomenology is in some sense prior to intentionality? And should they?
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  15.  85
    Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion.Adam Pautz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
  16.  88
    Have Byrne and Hilbert Answered Hardin's Challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.
    I argue that Byrne and Hilbert have not answered Hardin’s objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, _pace_ Byrne and Hilbert, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue- magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.
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  17. Color Eliminativism.Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    Philosophical theories of color divide over two issues. First, there is the issue of Reductionism versus Primitivism. _Reductionism_ holds that colors are identical with physical properties, dispositional properties, or other properties specifiable in non-chromatic terms.
     
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  18. An Argument for the Intentional View of Visual Experience.Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
     
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  19. The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain- Based Theory of Consciousnes.Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. pp. 237-298.
  20.  97
    Sensory Awareness as Irreducible: From Internalist Intentionalism to Primitivism.Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual _a priori_ considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly _a posteriori_ premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis.
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  21.  31
    An Argument Against Armstrong's Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals.Adam Pautz - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):109 – 111.
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  22.  62
    An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics.Adam Pautz - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347.
    I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some (...)
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  23. The Intentional Structure of Consciousness: A Primitivist Theory.Adam Pautz - manuscript -
     
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  24. The Hard Core of the Mind-Body Problem: Essays on Sensory Consciousness and the Secondary Qualities.Adam Pautz - 2004 - Dissertation, New York University
    The mind-body problem is one of the last great intellectual mysteries facing humankind. The hard core of the mind-body problem is the problem of qualitative character: the what-it's-likeness of conscious states. What is the nature of qualitative character? Can it be explained in terms of the intentional content of experience? What is the nature of the so-called secondary qualities---colors, sounds, smells, and so on? Finally, is Physicalism about qualitative character correct? In other words, are a person's qualitative mental properties determined, (...)
     
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  25. Colour, Philosophical Perspectives.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Wilken & Tim Bayne (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149.
    An overview of the main positions on colour.
     
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  26. Can Color Structure Be Explained in Terms of Color Experience?Adam Pautz - unknown -
    Hardin argues that Reflectance Physicalism about color fails because it cannot accommodate color structure. David Lewis and others have replied that the Reflectance Physicalist may explain color structure in terms of color experience. I argue that this reply fails.
     
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  27.  33
    Review of Jonathan Cohen, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology[REVIEW]Adam Pautz - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  28. Is Physicalism Simpler Than Dualism?Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    The problems with Physicalism that have most exercised its defenders are.
     
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  29. Festschrift for Ned Block.Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
     
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  30. Perception.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Routledge.
    Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? _Perception _is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial problems and recent work on the problem. Adam Pautz examines four of the most important theories of (...)
     
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  31. Themes From Block.Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
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  32. Tracking Intentionalism and Optimal Conditions: A Reply to Byrne and Tye.Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    In the mid-nineties, Fred Dretske, William Lycan and Michael Tye published books defending an ambitious new reductive program. The program came in two stages. The first was to defend Intentionalism. The second was to reduce the secondary qualities to external physical properties and then to explain sensory representation in terms of tracking under optimal conditions or biological function. The old reductive program was internalist: the idea used to be that we could reduce experiences to brain states. The new reductive program (...)
     
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  33. The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual a priori considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly a posteriori premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis.
     
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  34. Variation in Normal Color Vision and the Nature of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    It has been said that variation in normal color vision creates a problem for a certain theories of color. But there has been some controversy concerning the nature of the problem; indeed, it has been questioned whether there is even a problem at all. Here I do not use variation in normal color vision to develop a problem for any theory of color. Instead I use variation in normal color vision, together with certain natural assumptions, to develop a problem for (...)
     
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  35. Why Believe That Experiences Have Contents?Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    I provide an argument from the best explanation for the claim that experiences have contents. In particular, I argue that a common factor account of experience in terms of content provides the best explanation of the fact that both veridical and non-veridical experience can ground the capacity for thought, of indeterminate and impossible experiences, and of other features of experience.
     
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  36. What Does It Mean to Say That Experiences Have Contents?Adam Pautz - manuscript -
    I offer a formulation of the claim that experiences have contents.I also suggest a new method for determining what the contents of our experiences are, which can be applied to the issue of whether high-level properties such as being a tomato enter into the content of experience.
     
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