'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others

In Jose Luis Bermudez & José Luis Bermúdez (eds.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press (2005)
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Abstract

What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?

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Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University

Citations of this work

How visual perception yields reasons for belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351.
Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience.Anil Gomes - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):946-969.
Knowledge, perception and analysis.Quassim Cassam - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):214-226.
Knowing and Seeing: Responding to Stroud's Dilemma.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):571-589.

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